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ADDRESS DELIVERED BY JUSTICE JESSE W. CARTER OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE WEST LOS ANGELES UNIVERSITY 
SYNAGOGUE FORUM AT THE UNIVERSITY HIGH SCHOOL IN LOS ANGELES 
ON FEBRUARY THE 16TH. 1954, ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The F1fth Amendment to the Const1tution of the Un1te!d 
States provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a 
cap1tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the m1litia~ when in actual service 
in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in Jeopardy of life 
-+ 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
't/itness_against hims.elf, nor be deprived of life" Iibert;lJ or 
Qroperty, without due process of law:tnor shall private property 
be taken for nubIic use. without .iust compensatIon. (Emphasis 
added. ) Tt'.1s amendment 'i.'1as adopted in 1791. In Cd 11fornia, at 
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the present , our ConstItution provides (art. I, § 13) in 
part "In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party 
accused shall have the rIght to a speedy and publIc ; to 
have the process of the court to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend, In person and 
with counsel. No person sball be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense; nor be compelled, in snz criminal case, to be s 
witness agaInst himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
propertl without due process of law; but in anl criminal case, 
whether the defendant testifIes or not, his failure to explain 
or to deny by his testimonz apY evidence or facts in the case 
and may be considered by the. court or the jury. " (Emphasis 
added.) 
You have all no doubt read, and heard, a lot about 
the privilege against self-incrimination. That privilege is 
guaranteed to the individual by both the federal and state 
Constitutions in the provisions which I have just read to you. 
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As you all have learned, both Constitutions are subject to 
construction and interpretat10n by the rederal courts# 1nclud1ng 
the Supreme Court or the Un1ted states, and by the courts or 
Calirornla# 1ncluding the Supreme Court or which I am one or 
the seven justices. The construction and interpretation placed 
on both Constitutions by the highest courts or the land -- the 
United States Supreme Court, so far as federal questions are 
involved -- and the Supreme Court of California, so far as 
state questions are involved -- are binding on all lower courts 
of both the federal government and of the State of California. 
Inasmuch as the federal Constitution was adopted 
, 
first, I think it well to give you a very brief resume of the 
reasons leading to the adoption of the Fifth Amendment on which 
the comparable provision of the state Constitution was patterned 
in order that you may understand why it was felt necessary to 
safeguard the individual from being compelled to convict himself. 
Beglnnlngln about- 1236 A.D. in England, there were 
ecclesiastical courts. These courts took upon themselves much 
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the burden disputes -- not onll 
relating church law and custom, but various other types 
disputes. It was the practice of these courts at that time to, 
submit both the great and humble to what was called an "oath ex 
officio." The purpose of this inqu1ry was to discover 
suspected violat1ons of church law or custom, or to establish 
the truth of either vague or definite charges not disclosed to 
the person questioned. If the persons summoned to appear 
not do so, they were excommunicated; if they did appear, 
were forced to g1ve testimony, under oath, of not only the 
private sins of themselves, but of others. This practice 
continued, despite various orders from the. reignIng kings that 
the King's Courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all except 
matters of Matrimony and Testament and that they were expressly 
prohibited from holding such pleas in their courts. However, 
in cr1m1nal cases before the King's Council during this same 
period, an accused was required to appear in person, without 
counsel, and to answer the charges which were most likely not 
-4-
known to him ln advance. If the accused dld not ImmedlatelJ 
confess or explaln the charges, he was put to the method knowrL 
as the lnterrogatory examlnatlon. Thls practlce brought such 
protest from the Commons that a statute was passed wh1ch 
provlded that charges must be prererred aga1nst an accused by 
indictment or presentat10n and that "no man should be put to 
answers • [wlthout} •• due process and writ orlg1nal, 
according to the old law of the land." This statute, however, 
was not long in effect and a~ain the "oath ex officio" was the 
common practice. As each new monarch gained the throne, the 
measures put lnto·effect by the preceding monarch were undone. 
All that can safely be asserted 1s that the common lawyers both 
1n the second half of the 13th and all of the 14th centuries 
and under Henry VIII and Elizabeth, resisted the inquisltorlal 
procedure of the spIr1tual courts, whether Romlsh or Engllsh, 
and under Ellzabeth, began to base their opposl :,10n chlefly 
upon the. prlnc.lple that.8 . person could not be compelled to 
furnlsh under oath answers to charges which had not been formally 
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made and disclosed to him, except in causes testamentary and 
matrimonial. To common lawyers a system which required a per:son 
to :furnish his own indictment from hIs own lips under oath wa:s 
repugnant to the law of the land. About 1640, the accused 
began to clalm# and the Judges to concede, that a man on trial 
could not be compelled to answer questIons which would disclo:~e 
his guilt. Such compulsion was held to be lIillegal, most 
unjust, and against the liberty of the subject, and law of thE~ 
land, and Magna Charta, and unfit to continue upon record. 
However, the prIvilege was not absolute. When a prisoner was 
arraigned, he was required to identify himself by holding up 
his right hand or by expressly admitting that he was the perscm 
charged. Then he was asked how he would plead -- whether 
guilty or not guilty. If he refused to plead, the penalty 
depended upon the grade of the offense with which he was 
charged. If treason or a misdemeanor, he was trea ted as if hE! 
had pleaded guilty; if a felony, he was confined to prison-with 
a meagre allowance of bread on one day and water the next. 
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" 
Later # in addition to the alternate bread and water diet, he ~,as 
subjected to pressure -- which meant just that: a sharp stakE~, 
or piece of wood was placed under him, and a heavy weight 
sometimes as great as 400 pounds put on top of him. This 
usually killed him, or induced him within a period of an hour or 
so, to plead either guilty or not gu1lty. Usually, even if the 
accused pleaded not guilty, the jury found him guilty and 
sentenced him to hang. This horrible and barbaric practice was 
not discontinued until 1772. At that time the statute of 12 
Geo. III provided that if a person stood mute on his arraignmE~nt 
of piracy or felony, he should be convicted and the court ShO\lld 
award judgment and execution as if he had been convicted by 
verdict or confession. In 1827, standing mute in any criminal 
case was by statute (7 & 8 Geo., IV) made the equivalent of a 
plea of not guilty. 
From the middle of the 16th century to the middle of 
the 19th, the accused was subject to a preliminary examinatioll 
before a committing magistrate and was expected to answer. ID! 
was not warned that he need not answer. If he refused to
anS\1er, or if' he did answer, it was reported and put 1n evlden.ce
at his trial. Up to the middle ot the 17th century, torture
was used to extort confessions and no one seriously contended
that such confess1ons were not admissible against the accused.
In the 18th century" the accused began objecting to the use of' coerced
confessions, but it is not clear on just what ground the objections
were sustained: whether the coercion affected the weight of the
evidence, 
or whether coDressions obtained by duress and v1o1en.ce or
promises of benefit were considered to be not exactly reliable.
This, then, was the background in brief, which led
our forefathers to the firm conviction that no man should be
compelled to testify against himself.
If one is accused of something, or is asked quest1ot1lS
the logical way of looking at his refusal toabout something,
answer is that he surely ~ know something about it or else
In- Qthe~ words lit 1s saidwhy would he- refuse to answer!]
that the refusal to answer gives rise to an inference of guilt;
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of something. California, ou:r that an 
1s a tioD whlch from ,. Now, 
looklng at thls matter as intelligent men and has 
fact that our hypothetical person refused to answer questions 
proven anything? The only ... u ..... u.& that 1s sure that our witness 
has refused to answer. So rar a8 I am concerned, there are nc) 
less than three ini'e:rencGs which may be drawn from such a 
refusal to testify: (1) That the witness is ; (2) that 
he knows something, or some fact, which might tend to incriminate 
h1m. Note that this second ground 1s not the same as the first 
And/or (3) that he refuses to answer because he feela that the 
inquisitor has no right, and/or bUSiness, to ask him such 
questions. If we go back to the common law as it finally 
developed, we find that standing mute, in le~al effect, pleads 
not guilty. How can standing mute carry any danger to the 
accused when it 1s the legal equivalent of a plea of not guilty? 
A. canon of our law 1s. t.hat .1t latQ be Interpreted reasonably 
In view of accepted common law procedure. We have the old 
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common law which says, in effect. that standing mute is in
legal effect a plea ot not guilty. We have the present day
common assumption that if the witness doesn't answer# he must
have something to hide. And we have the constitutional
provisions which say, positively, that no man shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself. If he refuses to answer is hie,
in effect. pleading guilty to an offense of some sort with the'
consequent stigma attaching? Or is he merely standing on his
constitutional right which has been guaranteed to him# and if
80# should he not be ~elieved of any and all blame for having
claimed that right? If an inference of guilt arises, might he
not as well answer all questions even though his answers thereto
might tend to incriminate him?
The privilege against self-incrimination has been
1
held by the courts to apply in all judicial investigations;
to proceedings before a grand jury;2 and to Congressional
1 .
--Smith v.-Un1tedStates, 69 S.-ct. 1000-.
2 B1au v. United states. 340 u.s. 159.
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investigations.3 The privilege has been characterized by Judge 
Cardoza (Matter of Doyle" 257 N.Y. 244; 177 N.E. 489) as "a 
barrier interposed between the individual and the power of thE! 
government" a barrier interposed by the sovereign people of the 
State" which "neithe1" legislators nor judges are tree to 
overleap •••• " In the light of this definition, let us 
consider a Congressional investigation. A person called upon 
to testify there is only meagerly advised ot the subject to bE! 
pursued; he Is not as a rule represented by counsel and even If 
he is, since it is not an adversary proceedIng" his counsel 
has no right to object to the proceedings; the lights are bright 
1n the legislative committee room; newspaper men are ~re6ent 
as are photographers and television cameramen. There are none! 
of the safeguards ot the courtroom -- there is no right to 
confront the witnesses accusing our "person"; there is no 
judicial calm; our witness has only the Fifth Amendment with 
which- to protect himself. 
3 United States v. Yukio Abe" 95 Fed.Supp. 991; 
United States v. Emspak. 95 Fed.Supp. 1012. 
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Suppose out' witness is willing to answer all questions
concerning himself, but is not willing to answer questions wh:lch
might tend to incriminate others whom he knows, or has known.
May he answer the questions whose answers are personal to
himself and reruse to answer the others? No" he may not. ThjLs
is because of the rule of waiver. The meaning of this rule if!
that if a person is willing to testify and does not olaim the
privilege of silence. he may then be questioned concerning anjr
related matter. That which is related and that which is not
related is the subject of much controversy which has been
resolved in favor of permitting the widest possible inquiry.
It 1s well kno1Jm that Congressional committees 'J,se witnesses ~L8
a means of getting information about other people. The wltne~ls
has three choices in such a situation: (1) He may become an
(2) he may testify about himselr and reruse to nameinformer;
to tell all things personal to himselfo
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Let us carry our supposititious case one step farth4!r: 
Suppose our witness claims the privilege. What then? To the 
average m1nd, he has effectively admitted his guilt of the 
cr1me under cons1derat1on, whatever that may be. As for 
penalty, this witness does not yet go to Jail, but there are 
other penal ties just as severe. He loses his Job, or posi tiollj 
he is subject to severe criticism; he 1s subjected to adverse 
newspaper and radio publicity, commensurate in degree with hillS 
prominence in the public eye. He also has placed himself on 
the 11st of suspected persons and has guaranteed that more 
minute investigation will be made concerning him in the futurE~ 
Suppose he has not claimed the privilege and has freely 
answered questions concerning his past and present life. If 
some of his answers do not tally exactly with what other 
witnesses have said, then he runs the risk of a prosecution fClr 
perjury 0 When one remembers something that occurred perhaps 
thlrty_ years pr1Qr _ to_ j;h~_t_iJl!e_ he 1srec~1.11-nK i tL:t 1; _ tfJ _ very 
likely that his recollection might differ from that of another 
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person recalling the same transaction. In a court of law, thjls 
would merely create a conflict in the evidence, the resolution 
of that conflict resting with the trier ot tact whether judge 
or jury. In a Congress1onal investigation" such a conf11ct ms~y 
expose one or the other of the witnesses to a prosecution for 
perjury. Again, remember that at the investigation, our witnE~SS 
has no right to confront his accuser and ask him questions or, 
at that time, to rebut what his accuser has said. That right 
of confrontation guaranteed by both the federal and state 
Constitutions does not apply at such an investigat10n but only 
at a judiCial proceeding. At a Congressional investigation, a. 
w1tness 1s accorded none of the safeguards known to the law :in.d 
which we refer to as "due process of law." Is there not an 
analogy between such a pIJoceeding and the situation as it 
existed 1n England in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries? A 
witness compelled to answer and to p~ovide his accusers, by 
reason of his own silence .. or testimony, with the case against; 
himself? In other words, the result is veI~ likely to be tha.t 
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whichever choice he makes, he stands convicted. In a judicial 
system In which the accused must answer all questions, the 
pollee mIght be tempted to get the answers they wanted by any 
avaIlable means. The hIstory of our criminal law reveals that, 
there are no short cuts to justice: a case must be made 
against an accused who is innocent until proven guIlty. He 
-
does not have to prove his innocence; the prosecution must pro~ 
his guilt. As Mr. Justice Holmes said: "We have to choose, and 
for my part I think it a less evil that some cr1minals should 
escape than that the Government should play an 19noble part. H4 
Let us aga1n suppose that our witness clalms the 
prlvi1ege conferred by the Fifth Amendment, and let us assume 
that he Is wholly innocent of any crime. He may do so for 
several reasons: (I) He may have done something, or said 
someth1ng, or joined some organ1zation which was, at the 
it was done, sa1d, or Jolned, devoid of any crIminal aspect anjd 
may be so~ even at the time of the investIgation, but his answe:rs 
t _ 
4 Olmstead Vo United states, 277 u.s. 438. 
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might be offered as ev1dence against h1m in a criminal case; 
(2) he m1ght be willing to answer questions about himself, 
unwilling to answer them about others, and thus afraid to 
answer the personal questions because of the doctrine of waive'rj 
or 3) he m1ght be afraid that truthful answers might not check 
with answers given by someone else and thus subject him to a 
prosecut10n for perjury; or (4) he might simply and honestly 
disapprove of the entire investigation and the methods by which 
such proceedings are conducted, feeling that the questioning is 
not in accord with the principles of democracy laid down by the 
Framers of our great Constitution for th1swonderful country 
Imown a.s America. These rea.sons shmf that an inference of guilt 
1s not the only inference to be drawn when the privilege is 
claimed 
In America, by constitutional provision, we have 
rule that the government of this country shall be divided into 
three parts: Th~~xe~~t1ve, legislative and Jud1cial branches 
and that these three branches shall remain separate and apart 
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one from the other. By 1ts Congressional Investigations, the 
legislative branch is, theoretically, questioning to aid in 
legislative funct10ns. This is the only purpose tor which sUClh 
investigat10ns are permitted. To permit such investigations 
ror any other purpose would be an invalid encroachment upon 
judicial branoh of the government. From what we have read anell 
heard of' present day Congressional investigations, it is 
difficult to say that the investigat10ns oan serve any useful 
legislative purpose, but it 1s not difficult to see that they 
appear to encroach on the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts! 
without the judicial safeguards which there prevail 
How far does the privilege go? Does it extend to 
papers, writings and personal effects? The Supreme Court of t;he 
United States has held that it does not protect an individual 
from producing in response to a subpoena (a) a writing which 1.s 
of a publIc, or a semi-public character or (b) a writing of 
which he is not entitled to possessIon inhjacapaclty aB_ an 
individual 0 Does it apply to the individual himself? Does it; 
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cover personal features, qua11ties, or conditions wh1ch he can 
not control? Does it apply to the objective appearance of the 
ind1vidua1's body, his measurements, h1s fingerprints. his 
footprints, his saliva, his breath, his blood? The answer 1s 
no, that it does not. It has been held that blood taken from 
an unconscious person may be used in evidence aga1ns,t him; 5 
it has been held that an accused may be forced to exh1bit himself 
in the courtroom; try on hats. coats, shoes and the like; it has 
been held that a doctor examining an accused for drunkenness may 
testify as to his findings made after various tests. In 
California, it was held proper tor the contents of a stomach 
taken forcibly by means of a stomach pump by off1cers,of the 
law to be used to conv1ct one accused of narcot1c add1ct1on. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed a 
majority of the Supreme Court ofCa11torn1a and held that such 
conduct on the part of law enforcement officers shocked the 
5 State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577; . People v. Haeussler, 
41 A.C. 256. 
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There can be no doubt that we are living in an age 
which, as a great man once said, "are times that try men's 
souls." We are constantly warned that we are surrounded with 
subversion from within and without. There can be no doubt tha,t 
the entire world is in conflict. There can be no doubt but 
that the world has been in conflict before. Our forebears and 
we have weathered a Civil War, a Revolutionary War, and two 
great world wars, to say nothIng of lesser affrays. We must 
not forget that our great Constitution was written because the 
Framers were firmly convinced that While individual rights must 
be circumscribed for the publIc good, those rights should be 
preserved as fully as was possible to the end that every 
individual should be accorded freedom of religion, of speech, 
of press, of peaceable assembly, that the right of privacy 
should not be vIolated, and that no person should be deprived 
of his life, hIs liberty, or his property without due process 
of law 
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In times such as these in which we are now living,
when suspicion and distrust of one's neighbor is the rule,
rather than the exception, we must strive for a calm attitude.
We must not allow ourselves to become hysterical and we must
remember that our forefathers fought a bitter and terrible
f'lght that we might have our Constitution and its safeguards for
the individual. We must not permit legislation to be enacted
without considering the balance between the object to be
achieved and the liberties of the individual; we must study any
such proposals with the greatest of care and caution.
There 1s now proposed a na t1onal la\1 which would
grant immunity from criminal prosecution to all ~iho ~1i1l testify
concerning not only themselves but others. This law is
proposed. 
primarily, as a means of overcoming the invocation or
the Firth Amendment by persons subpoenaed by Congressional
.c mmittees.
It is extremely dubious if' the law would have the
desired effect.- For one thing,t- the immunity granted would. and






reason 1s that any determ1ned, unrepentant person engaged in 
subvers1ve activ1ty would st11l cla1m the F1fth Amendment. In 
an excellent art1cle" wr1tten by Dorothy Thompson ("Satan 
Versus Beelzebub, _L .... ad ....1 ... e ... s ... .!!2!!. Journal. February. 1954), she 
comments on the proposed law as follows: "The proposed law w11l 
not, I . th1nk. result 1n obta1ning more evidence from reliable 
witnesses. Communists determined to keep the party's records 
secret will still invoke the Fifth Amendment; communists wishing 
to protect themselves and important members of the party at the 
cost of lesser fry will exploit the law; ex-communists who hate 
tattling obviously will not be moved by promises of immunity 
for t hemselves. 
"It is a law for the protection of informers who are 
to be elevated into a position of special grace. And if such 
a law becomes sweet to the taste of the people, we shall be 
just a l1tt1e nearer the pOint of an informer in every factory, 
• 
-- -apartment- house,,- -attice- and- b-lock .. . <If--ch1ldreIL _in1'-orm1n/LQU ___ _____ ____ :...._ 
their parents and teachers; just a l1ttle nearer to the end of 
all mutual trust, all social happiness, all freedom. 
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"In short, we shall be nearer to every evil that we 
hate, loathe and despise in communism. This 1s certainly not 
thev1s1on or deSire of Mr. Brownell." 
I think there has not been a day 1n the past, nor Is 
there a day in the present, when all of us do not thank God 
that we live 1n Amer1ca where we have freedom, equality and 
Justice for all -- not Just for a few. The practices which 
prevailed in Nazi Germany, and which we hear prevail in Russia 
and Communist-dominated countrIes, are abhorrent to all free 
Americans. If we are to keep our heritage of freedom, we must. 
remember that the freedoms guaranteed to us by our Constitution 
are freedoms tor all -- for every person. Those accused of 
crime must be accorded every safeguard prescribed in order tha.t 
those unjustll accused may not suffer the penalties which the 
law provides shall be inflicted on those found guilty after a 
fair and impartial trial. It we do not remember the 
fundamental basis on which ourConstltution rests and work to 
preserve its mandates, then we ahall be no better orf than the' 
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peoples of ~hose countries where freedom. equality and justice 
tor all 1s not the rule. 
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